When family trusts affect the value of firms by Singapore Management University
Singapore Management University 
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 
Perspectives@SMU Centre for Management Practice 
10-2019 
When family trusts affect the value of firms 
Singapore Management University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/pers 
 Part of the Portfolio and Security Analysis Commons 
Citation 
Singapore Management University. When family trusts affect the value of firms. (2019). 
Perspectives@SMU. 
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/pers/524 
This Magazine Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Centre for Management Practice at 
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University. It has been accepted for inclusion in 
Perspectives@SMU by an authorized administrator of Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management 
University. For more information, please email library@smu.edu.sg. 
When family trusts affect the value of firms 
31 Oct 2019 
This article is republished with permission by China Business Knowledge at Chinese University 
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Share transfer restriction may induce family shirking problems, make family conflicts difficult to 
resolve, and distort firm decisions 
Ownership structure plays a critical role in the incentives and behavior of business organisations. 
The effects of firm ownership dispersion across managers and investors has been examined in 
past studies. Yet Professor Joseph P. H. Fan from the Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK) 
has extended the literature by examining the roles of ownership structure within a controlling 
family. 
His research “The impact of ownership transferability on family firm governance and 
performance: The case of family trusts” examines specifically on the family trust structure, which 
is commonly used among Fortune 500 family firms. 
Companies controlled by family trusts or similar structures include The New York 
Times newspaper, department store chain Walmart and global furniture retailer IKEA. 
“Family trusts are typically established for inheritance tax avoidance, asset protection against 
undesirable events such as divorce, bankruptcy, taxation and hostile takeovers,” says Prof. Fan 
of Department of Finance and School of Accountancy at CUHK Business School. “The trust 
structure often locks controlling ownership within a family for a very long period.” 
In collaboration with Dr. Winnie S.C. Leung from the University of Hong Kong (HKU), the study 
focused on 216 distinct family firms listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, including 72 firms 
using family trusts and 144 firms using direct ownership. 
The data was collected over the period from 1990 to 2008, which included the 2006 abolition of 
inheritance tax in Hong Kong, which ended the tax advantage of family trusts. 84 of the firms 
were in manufacturing, 52 in finance, insurance and real estate and 44 in wholesale and retail. 
THE COST OF FAMILY DISPUTES 
Different from prior studies, which almost unanimously focus on conflicts between corporate 
insiders and outsiders, his study looked at the impacts of intra-family ownership structures and 
conflicts between family members on firm behaviours and performance. 
For example, he found that the sibling structure of a family, in particular the age gap between the 
first and last sons of the founder, could be a source of conflict. 
“When the age gap is large, sons or daughters arguably have more diverse interests and very 
different ideologies for managing family issues. A large age distance also indicates high conflict 
potential,” he says. 
Prof. Fan says that founders of firms are not always able to correctly predict the consequences of 
adopting a family trust structure. In particular, they may underestimate the cost of keeping family 
harmony, or counteracting family disputes when a trust ties descendants up in the family 
business. 
“The share transfer restriction may induce family members to shirk, making family conflicts 
difficult to resolve and distort company decisions,” he says. 
Prof. Fan cites a well-known case of Sun Hung Kai Properties (SHKP), a leading property 
developer and the second largest business conglomerate in Hong Kong. 
Its founder, Kwok Tak-seng, transferred controlling interest of the company into a family trust as 
part of his succession plan before he died in 1990. The trust was set up in Jersey with a 100-year 
rule and with his wife and three sons as the beneficiaries. The trust appointed the three sons to 
co-manage the family business. Unfortunately, the brothers were not able to stay in harmony 
after Kwok died. 
The Lo family, the founding family of prominent property developer Great Eagle Group in Hong 
Kong, is another victim of family fighting in which family trust ownership is at the center of the 
dispute. 
“There was hardly an exit from the family ownership structure because the family stakes were 
locked up in the trust.” 
“The trust actually prolonged family infighting, and the corporate value of the business eroded 
substantially in the process,” says Prof. Fan. 
He further explains that the ability to transfer ownership is an important mechanism for resolving 
disputes between family members. 
“When family members directly hold ownership, their income or dividend and voting rights are 
clearly delineated. If a family member decides to exit the family business, he or she can simply 
sell his or her shares either back to the family or to outsiders.” 
In other words, the selling family members can walk away with a fortune, while the active buying 
family members can have a more robust incentive and control over the firm. 
“In contrast, the use of a family trust suppresses the transfer rights of the family ownership and 
blocks this buyout channel,” he says. 
The trust deed typically specifies a long or even indefinite period before the trust can be 
dissolved and ownership can be transferred. 
THE NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF USING A TRUST 
Through marriages and having children, the controlling family increases in size and complexity 
over time. More and more family members are added as trust beneficiaries. 
However, in an acute environment where competition is high, trust beneficiaries are inclined to 
exploit resources from the family business for their own benefit and sustain less for future 
corporate development. 
“Our study shows that when family conflict potential increases, firms that adopt a family trust tend 
to have higher dividend payouts, lower capital expenditures and a worse performance.” 
Moreover, for firms using a family trust, family managers may find it hard to consolidate control to 
make timely critical decisions. 
“The results support our hypothesis that a founder’s choice of trust that underestimates the family 
conflict potential distorts family managers’ behavior when making company decisions.” 
As the family’s size grows over time, the average cash flow rights of a given family beneficiary 
shrink. This further tempts family beneficiaries to focus on the near term. 
“When a family trust provides no exit for resolving conflicts, consolidation of control is difficult. 
Unhappy families with entrusted ownership can impede corporate development and destroy firm 
value,” Prof. Fan says. 
IMPLICATIONS 
“Our study not only adds to the existing academic literature, but also informs business owners 
and practitioners contemplating the ownership structures of the firms they serve,” says Prof. Fan, 
adding that the findings shed light on the direction of future research. 
“Owing to a lack of information, we were unable to examine the role of family governance in 
mitigating family conflict potential, and look at original trust deeds when they include conflict 
prevention clauses. Both these important issues merit further research,” he says. 
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